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Ernest E. Figar; Jr. *
T HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
survey period are found in judicial decisions, constitutional amend-
ments,' and statutory enactments. 2 This survey examines these
developments and considers their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
During the survey period Texas voters approved several constitutional
amendments expanding the jurisdiction of the justice court. Article V of
the Texas Constitution now provides that the justice court may exercise
jurisdiction over cases in which the matter in controversy does not exceed
five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest, so long as exclusive jurisdiction
of such cases is not lodged elsewhere. 3 The exclusive jurisdiction of the
justice courts was, however, not altered. 4 Accordingly, in cases in which
the matter in controversy exceeds two hundred dollars but does not exceed
five hundred dollars, the county courts share concurrent jurisdiction with
the justice courtsi The statutory provisions governing jurisdiction of the
justice and county courts were also amended to reflect this constitutional
revision.6
A change in the amount in controversy alleged by the plaintiff was the
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Meth-
odist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author acknowledges the very con-
siderable assistance of Thomas A. Graves and Storrow Moss Gordon, Attorneys at Law, in
the preparation of this Article.
1. The two constitutional amendments that relate to the procedural area concern sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 16, 19.
2. The enactments that have procedural implications principally concern personal ju-
risdiction, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 lb, § 4 & art. 8306, § 2a (Vernon Supp. 1980);
subject matter jurisdiction, id. arts. 1949, 2385; venue, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1980); limitations, id. § 17.56A, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts.
5526, 5527 (Vernon Supp. 1980); exemption from jury service, id. art. 2135; use of an inter-
preter in civil proceedings, id. art. 3712a; information made privileged from discovery, id.
art. 41a, § 26 & art. 5561h; court-ordered blood testing in paternity suits, TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 13.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980); establishment of a claim for services, TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 3737h (Vernon Supp. 1980); recovery of attorneys' fees, id. art. 2226; collec-
tion of judgments, id. art. 3827a; and an expansion of permissible interlocutory appeals, id.
art. 2250.
3. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 19. In addition, the amendment grants authority to the legis-
lature to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the justice courts up to an amount not
exceeding one thousand dollars. Id. To date, however, the legislature has not taken advan-
tage of this additional authority. See note 6 infra.
4. Id.
5. Id., §§ 16, 19.
6. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1949, 2385 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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subject of judicial examination in Flynt v. Garcia.7 In a suit brought in a
county court at law, the plaintiff filed a trial amendment increasing the
amount sought to be recovered from $4,778.40 to $6,242.40 to reflect addi-
tional damages accruing through passage of time. Applying the general
rule that "where jurisdiction is once lawfully and properly acquired, no
subsequent fact or event in the particular case serves to defeat that jurisdic-
tion,"' 8 the supreme court held that the county court at law could properly
render judgment for the full amount sought by the plaintiff.9
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The propriety of out-of-state service under article 2031b, 10 the Texas
long-arm statute, continues to be the subject of judicial attention. " Sec-
tion 3 of article 2031 b authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonres-
ident when he is "doing business" in Texas.' 2 "Doing business," as
defined by section 4, includes "entering into a contract by mail or other-
wise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in this State."' 3 The opinion of the federal district court in Docutel
Corp. v. S.A. Matra,14 a case in which a Texas firm sued two French cor-
porations for alternative tort and breach of contract claims, is a virtual
guidebook for a plaintiff seeking to invoke article 2031b. Focusing ini-
tially on the contract claim, the court observed that section 4 was met even
though the subject contract did not, by its terms, require performance in
Texas, provided the contracting defendant could reasonably foresee that
the plaintiff would perform its obligations thereunder in Texas.' 5 On this
basis the court sustained service of process upon the contracting defendant
with respect to the contract claim.
Significantly, in a ruling of first impression in Texas, the court in Docu-
tel applied an "overlay" analysis, under which overlapping facts justifying
the assertion of personal jurisdiction under article 2031 b over one claim
furnish a basis for jurisdiction over alternative claims involving the same
7. 587 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam).
8. Id. at 109-10 (following Haginas v. Malbis Memorial Foundation, 163 Tex. 274, 354
S.W.2d 368 (1962); Isbell v. Kenyon-Warner Dredging Co., 113 Tex. 528, 261 S.W. 762
(1924)).
9. The opinion of the court appears to be limited to cases where the amendment adds
damages accruing only because of the passage of time. See 587 S.W.2d at 110. The supreme
court rejected as judicially uneconomical the holding of the court of civil appeals that the
county court at law could entertain the suit, but could not award any amount of damages in
excess of its jurisdictional limits. Id.
10. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980).
I 1. In a holding that would limit appellate review of a due process inquiry under article
203 1b, a federal district court in Western Desert, Inc. v. Chase Resources Corp., 460 F.
Supp. 63 (N.D. Tex. 1978), stated that "[tihe question of whether the defendant ... has
created sufficient contacts with Texas such that personal jurisdiction may be obtained under
the Texas long-arm statute is a question of fact." Id. at 66.
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964).
13. Id. art. 203 1b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
14. 464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
15. Id. at 1215-16.
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facts. 16 The court concluded that since the tort claim arose from substan-
tially the same facts as the contract claim, the assertion of jurisdiction over
the contracting defendant on the tort claim comported with due process for
the same reasons that personal jurisdiction on the contract claim com-
ported with due process.' 7
With respect to the second defendant, the court noted that, while it was
not a party to the subject contract, it had dispatched representatives to
Texas to investigate business opportunities and ultimately purchased ap-
proximately $9,000,000 worth of goods from various third parties located
in Texas. Invoking the doctrine of "unrelated contacts," which authorizes
reliance upon business contacts that are unrelated to the asserted cause of
action for the purpose of supporting personal jurisdiction,' 8 the court sus-
tained service over the second defendant, concluding that: "It is not unfair
or unreasonable to require a corporation which over the course of the sev-
enties has purchased nearly $9,000,000 worth of goods manufactured and
sold in Texas and has sent numerous representatives to the state to defend
a suit brought in Texas."' 9
Finally, Doculel is also significant for its confirmation that the Texas
Supreme Court has a more restrictive view of the federal due process re-
quirements of nonresident service than the federal courts. Since it is well
settled that article 2031b reaches as far as the Federal Constitution will
permit,20 any challenge to service under the statute necessarily reduces to
an inquiry into whether due process is satisfied.21 During a previous sur-
vey period, the Texas Supreme Court, apparently overlooking federal au-
thority that sustained nonresident service in analogous situations, 22
concluded in U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Bur123 that a defendant's con-
tacts with Texas did not satisfy federal constitutional requirements and,
therefore, affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.24 Ignoring the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of the four-
16. Id. at 1216-17.
17. Id. at 1217.
18. See, e.g., Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685-86 (5th Cir. 1977); Wilker-
son v. Fortuna Corp , 554 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Jetco
Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1973); Coulter v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1970); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v Killian, 414
F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 455, 456-57 (1979).
19. 464 F. Supp. at 1220.
20. See, e.g., U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Michigan Gen. Corp. v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, Inc., 582 S.W.2d
594, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
21. See, e.g., Southern Nat'l Bank v. Tri Financial Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1191 (S.D.
Tex. 1970), modifedon other grounds sub nom. Southern Nat'l Bank v. Crateo, Inc., 458 F.2d
688 (5th Cir. 1972) ("This test ... reduces to due process, for the long arm of Texas has as
great a reach as due process permits").
22. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Product Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
23. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
24. The plaintiff, a Texas advertising firm, brought suit in Texas against an Oklahoma
resident to collect sums due under a written contract. Service was effected by means of TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980). The contract was solicited in
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teenth amendment and returning the focus of inquiry to federal authority,
the Docutel court concluded that "U-Anchor . . .cannot be read to pre-
clude a court from following federal precedent in determining due process
for purposes of article 2031 b."'25
Rockwell International Corp. v. KND Corp. ,26 a recent decision of a fed-
eral district court, is significant for its studious analysis of existing prece-
dent in the area. Distilling the various tests of due process advanced by
other courts,27 the court concluded that the central inquiry under article
2031b is "whether the defendant's contact with the forum rests on some-
thing more substantial than mere fortuity, when viewed from the defend-
ant's perspective, that the plaintiff happens to be a resident of the
forum."'28 Moreover, "[pihysical presence within the forum is not determi-
native, ' 29 as "[ilt is well established that activities outside the forum that
have reasonably forseeable consequences within may support a court's ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction. '30
Two statutory enactments in the area of personal jurisdiction should be
noted. First, the definition of "doing business" contained in section 4 of
article 2031b has been expanded to include "[tihe act of recruiting Texas
residents, directly or through an intermediary located in Texas, for em-
ployment inside or outside of Texas."'31 Since article 2031b has already
been construed to be limited only by the constraints of due process under
the federal constitutin,32 the change seems unnecessary.
Oklahoma by the plaintiff and was executed by both parties in that state. With respect to
performance, the contract required the plaintiff to erect five advertising displays at specified
locations in Oklahoma and obligated the defendant to send payment to the plaintiff's offices
in Amarillo. The defendant mailed six checks to Amarillo, but had no other contacts with
Texas. On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that the defendant's contacts with
Texas did not satisfy federal constitutional requirements, and, therefore, affirmed the trial
court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 407, 408-09 (1978).
25. 464 F. Supp. at 1219.
26. 83 F.R.D. 556 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
27. See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 1974)
(two-element test); Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 99 (S.D. Tex.
1963) (five-element test); U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (two- or three-element test); O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.,
399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966) (three-element test). See generally Michigan Gen. Corp. v.
Mod-U-Kraf Homes, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 594, 596-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
28. 83 F.R.D. at 564.
29. Id. at 563; accord, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710, 61 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1979); Western Desert, Inc. v. Chase Re-
sources Corp., 460 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Southern Nat'l Bank v. Tri Financial
Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1970), modif ed on other grounds sub nom. South-
ern Nat'l Bank v. Crateo, Inc., 458 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1972).
30. 83 F.R.D. at 564; accord, Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496-
97 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
32. See, e.g., U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert.




Adding to the existing framework of Texas long-arm statutes, 33 section
2a of article 8306, which covers the field of workers' compensation, was
recently amended.34 The prior version authorized service upon a nonresi-
dent defendant in any suit "growing out of any accident resulting in the
injury or death of any employee of said nonresident, occurring in the
course of employment of the employee in this State," by serving the chair-
man of the Industrial Accident Board, provided the nonresident had em-
ployed labor within Texas.35 As amended, section 2a now permits long-
arm service on a nonresident in any action against the nonresident arising
out of any accident resulting in the injury or death of any employee of the
nonresident "occurring in the course of employment of the employee in a
foreign jurisdiction when the employee is a Texas resident recruited in this
State." 36
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Butler v. Butler 37 is a warning that rule 120a,38 which authorizes a de-
fendant to make a special appearance for the purpose of questioning
whether his person is "amenable to process" issued by the trial court, can-
not be used to raise the issue of defective service. Finding that the sole
issue at a special appearance is jurisdiction over the person, the court con-
cluded that "[b]y only raising the issue of defective service, appellant
waived his special appearance" 39 and "thereby turned the special appear-
ance into a general appearance. '40
In a suit brought against two defendants in which one of them asserted a
special appearance, the trial court sustained the appearance, and the plain-
tiff took an appeal from the ruling. The appellate court in Sullivan v. Tab
Sales Co.4 held that the order was not appealable because the ruling did
not dispose of all parties and claims.
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The most important decision during the last year dealing with service of
process was Butler v. Butler.4 2 Although arising out of service upon a resi-
dent of Louisiana pursuant to rule 108, 43 the decision turned upon an in-
33. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980); id. art.
2039a; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1980); TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
34. See TEX. REV. CIv STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 2a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
35. 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 188, § 2, at 503.
36. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 2a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
37. 577 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ dism'd).
38. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a.
39. 577 S.W.2d at 504.
40. Id. at 507.
41. 576 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
42. 577 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ dism'd).
43. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108, which governs service of process upon a defendant outside of
the state, provides in part that:
Where the defendant is absent from the State or is a nonresident of the
State, the form of notice to such defendant of the institution of the suit shall be
the same as prescribed for citation to a resident defendant; and such notice
1980]
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terpretation of the method of substituted service authorized by rule 10644
as incorporated in rule 108. Following authorization by the trial court, the
defendant, who after considerable effort could not be located in his state of
residence, was served by sending the citation and petition by certified mail,
return receipt requested, to his attorney of record in a competing action in
Louisiana. Although he did not contend that this method of service failed
to provide him with actual notice of the Texas proceeding, the defendant
appeared through counsel and questioned the propriety of such service.
The court of civil appeals approved the method of service used, finding
that it was reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice of suit.4 5
V. VENUE
In 1977 the Texas Legislature liberalized section 17.56 of the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act to provide for venue in
specified counties in actions "which allege a claim to relief" under the
Act.46 In the first cases to construe this amendment, three courts of civil
appeals47 have held that a plaintiff must allege, but need not prove, a cause
of action under the Act in order to sustain venue in the places specified.
48
All three courts, however, also recognized that the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant "resides, has his principal place of business, or has done
business" in the county where suit is brought before venue under the 1977
amendment to section 17.56 could be sustained there. In Pettit v. En-
gland,49 for example, plaintiff offered no proof at the venue hearing, rely-
ing solely upon his petition alleging a cause of action under the Act. The
court held that there was no evidence of "any legislative intent to change
prior case law on proof of residence or business location" and that the
may be served by any disinterested person competent to make oath of the fact
in the same manner as provided in Rule 106 hereof . . . A defendant served
with such notice shall be required to appear and answer in the same manner
and time and under the same penalties as if he had been personally served
with a citation within this State to the full extent that he may be required to
appear and answer under the Constitution of the United States in an action
either in rem or in personam.
(Emphasis added). See generaly Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 295 (1976).
44. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106. In addition to specifying certain methods of service upon a
defendant, the residual section of rule 106 provides that "the court, upon motion, may au-
thorize service. . . in any. . . manner which will be reasonably effective to give the defend-
ant notice of the suit."
45. 577 S.W.2d at 507.
46. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, § 8, at 604, discussed in Figari, supra note 18, at 462-
63. That version of section 17.56 has since been amended. See text accompanying note 58
infra.
47. Pettit v. England, 583 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); Compu-
Center, Inc. v. Compubill, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no
writ); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
48. All three courts recognized that the legislature intended by its 1977 amendments to
overrule the holdings in prior cases that a plaintiff under the Act must prove and plead a
cause of action. See, e.g., Doyle v. Grady, 543 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ). See also Figari, supra note 18, at 463.
49. 583 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
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burden was upon plaintiff to establish these venue facts.50
Focusing upon the sufficiency of evidence necessary to satisfy the "doing
business" provision of section 17.56, the court in Dairyland County Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Harrison"' imposed a relatively light burden on the plain-
tiff. The proof found sufficient to sustain venue in Harris County consisted
solely of a page from the Houston "yellow pages" telephone directory that
listed several insurance agencies with Harris County addresses as "agents"
for the defendant.5 2 Adopting a stricter construction of the "doing busi-
ness" test, the court in Conpu-Center, Inc. v. Compubill, Inc. 53 looked to
the "doing business" provision of the Texas long-arm statute54 for gui-
dance. Although the defendants had other clients in the county of suit, the
court found that the parties had not entered into a contract to be per-
formed in whole or in part by any party in that county, and accordingly
held that venue would not lie.55
The decisions construing "doing business" in Dairyland and Compu-
Center are, however, of limited relevance to future actions brought under
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. 56 Effec-
tive August 27, 1979, the Texas Legislature again amended section 17.56,
this time deleting the "doing business" provision.57 Actions that allege a
claim to relief under the Act may now be commenced:
in the county in which the person against whom the suit is brought
resides, has his principal place of business, or has a fixed and estab-
lished place of business at the time the suit is brought or in the county
in which the alleged act or practice occurred or in a county in which
the defendant or an authorized agent of the defendant solicited the
transaction made the subject of the action at bar.58
In Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Jim Dandy Fast Foods, Inc. 59 the court
considered the applicability of subdivision 5(a) of article 199560 to a suit
for declaratory judgment to interpret a contract. The defendant's grant of
a right to use its trademark to a plaintiff residing in the county of suit was
held to satisfy the requirement that the obligation be performable in the
county of suit.61
Subdivision 31 of article 1995, which governs venue in "[s]uits for
breach of warranty by a manufacturer of consumer goods,"'62 was again
the subject of judicial interpretation during this survey period. Focusing
upon the scope of the term "consumer goods" as used in that subdivision,
50. Id. at 876-77.
51. 578 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
52. Id. at 191.
53. 580 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
54. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
55. 580 S.W.2d at 91.
56. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
57. See id. § 17.56.
58. Id.
59. 574 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
60. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (5a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
61. 574 S.W.2d at 601.
62. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(31) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
19801
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the court in L & M-Surco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Winn Tile Co. 63 held that
mortar and grout compounds purchased by an installer of ceramic tiles
and used in the construction of a swimming pool were not "consumer
goods" so as to allow the installer to maintain venue in the county of its
residence. In reaching this result, the court considered and rejected the
broad interpretation of the term given by two courts of civil appeals. 64
Instead, the court accepted an argument that those courts had previously
rejected,65 and relied upon the definition of consumer goods set forth in
sections 9.10966 and 2.103(C)6 7 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code, as
well as those definitions set forth in other state and federal statutes. 68 Not-
ing that all of these definitions limit the term to products used for personal,
family, or household purposes, the court held that "a commercial product
purchased by a business entity strictly for use by mixing with other materi-
als in commercial construction" is not a consumer good.69
Mutual Savings & Loan Association v. Earnest70 raised the question of
the trial court's power to transfer a case filed in one county to a county
other than that of the defendant's residence when the defendant asserted
its right to be sued in the county of its residence. In Earnest the plaintiffs
filed suit in Bowie County. When the defendant filed its plea to be sued in
Hunt County, however, the plaintiffs filed a controverting plea alleging a
written contract performable in Rockwall County and requesting that the
case be transferred there. Holding that the plaintiff was required to plead
and prove that the suit was properly brought where it was originally filed
in order to overcome the defendant's plea of privilege, the court stated that
"lilt is not proper to transfer a case to a third county, even if venue would
be properly maintainable there had the suit been filed there originally."'7'
Barnes v. Waters Equipment Co. 72 dealt with the effect upon a contro-
verting plea of a subsequent amendment to the petition that had been in-
corporated by reference into the plea. The plaintiff in that case had
alleged in its controverting plea only that one of the two defendants had
63. 580 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism'd).
64. Trucker's Equip., Inc. v. Sandoval, 569 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, no writ); Maintenance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd). Both of these cases dealt with goods
used for agricultural purposes.
65. 569 S.W.2d at 523; 554 S.W.2d at 32. The court in Winn did not, however, disap-
prove the result reached in those cases, recognizing that TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1995(5(b)) (Vernon Supp. 1980) includes goods used for agricultural purposes within its defi-
nition of consumer goods. Instead, the court read the two cases as authority for the limited
proposition that agricultural goods may be consumer goods. See 580 S.W.2d at 928.
66. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
67. Id. § 2.103(c) (Vernon 1968).
68. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2052(a)(1), 2301(I) (Supp. 1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts.
5069-11.01, -13.01 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
69. 580 S.W.2d at 927. The court in Winn did not, however, attempt to articulate a
comprehensive definition of consumer goods. Id.
70. 582 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
71. Id. at 535.
72. 582 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
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entered into a written contract under subdivision 5 of article 1995. 73 When
its proof at the venue hearing failed to show venue under that subdivision,
however, the plaintiff sought and received leave to file a trial amendment
alleging fraud and contended that this was sufficient to sustain venue over
both defendants under subdivision 29a.74 Finding that the facts alleged in
an amendment to an original petition are not automatically incorporated
into a controverting plea, the court held that before the allegations in such
an amended petition may be considered at a venue hearing, the contro-
verting plea itself must be amended to make it clear that the affiant is
swearing to the facts in the amended petition.75
VI. PLEADINGS
Booker Custom Packing Co. v. Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc. 76 dem-
onstrates how the use of an opponent's pleading can conclusively establish
an allegation contained in such pleading. The plaintiff brought an action
to recover unpaid freight charges for delivery of meat, and the defendant
sought an offset for the value of meat damaged by the plaintiff in a prior
shipment. In rebutting the defendant's case, the plaintiff read to the jury a
portion of the defendant's pleading alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff
had failed to comply with its promise to deliver a quantity of meat by a
certain date and that the resulting delay in delivery caused the meat to
deteriorate. Relying on the "long standing rule in Texas" that the allega-
tions of a pleading are conclusively established when a party offers in evi-
dence his opponent's pleading without limitation,77 the court of civil
appeals held that a jury finding in favor of the defendant's offset claim for
the value of damaged meat was supported by the evidence. The court,
however, noted that the rule "is an extraordinarily harsh one. . . since an
unsworn pleading, even if offered by the opposing party, logically does not
tend to show what the true facts are, but only what the pleader has asserted
them to be, unless its allegations are contrary to the position taken by the
pleader at the trial." 78
Rule 185 provides that a suit on sworn account "shall be taken as prima
facie evidence thereof, unless the party resisting such claim shall. . . file a
written denial, under oath, stating [1] that each and every item is not just
or true, or [2] that some specified item or items are not just and true."'79
Although the defendant in Sundance Oil Co. v. Aztec Pipe & Supply Co. 80
73. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5(a)) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
74. Id. art. 1995(29(a)).
75. 582 S.W.2d at 581.
76. 575 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
77. Id. at 330; see Seddon v. Harrison, 367 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lincoln v. Pohly, 325 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); McClung Constr. Co. v. Langford Motor Co., 33 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1930, no writ); Texas & New Orleans Ry. v. Patterson & Roberts, 192 S.W. 585
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1917, no writ).
78. 575 S.W.2d at 330-31.
79. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
80. 576 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1978).
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failed to file a sworn denial to an action on a sworn account, the supreme
court held that such a denial was not required because the plaintiff's sworn
invoices contained the names of two different companies and, thus, raised
a fact issue as to which company was actually indebted to the plaintiff.81
In Rizk v. Financial Guardian Insurance Agency, Inc. 82 the defendant's an-
swer stated that each and every item in the plaintiffs sworn account was
not just or true in whole or in part and, in addition, alleged the affirmative
defenses of lack of consideration and limitations. Finding that the affirma-
tive defenses were consistent with the verified denial and that they could
have been raised even in the absence of a verified denial under rule 185,
the supreme court concluded that the defendant's answer complied with
the requirements of the rule.83
A distinction in the manner of pleading for the recovery of prejudgment
interest sought at common law as an element of damages and prejudgment
interest based on statute 84 was drawn by the supreme court in Republic
National Bank v. Northwest National Bank.85 The court held that when
the prejudgment interest is to be awarded under a statute, in this case arti-
cle 5069-1.03,86 a general prayer for relief is sufficient. 87 On the other
hand, if prejudgment interest is sought as damages, a specific prayer for
relief must be pleaded.88
The supreme court in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. LaCoke89 was
faced with the question of whether a petition filed one day late should be
deemed to be timely filed when the delay was caused by an act of a deputy
district clerk. In this workers' compensation action, the petition to set
aside the decision of the Industrial Accident Board was not received within
the statutory time period 90 because the deputy district clerk had instructed
the post office to postpone the second of two daily deliveries of mail until
the following day. Relying on a previous case holding that an instrument
is deemed filed when it is placed in the control or custody of the clerk,9'
the court concluded that the petition was in the control of the clerk because
81. Id. at 780-81.
82. 584 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1979).
83. Id. at 863.
84. Prejudgment interest based on a statute is known as interest eo nomine. Republic
Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 117 (Tex. 1979).
85. 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978).
86. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1979).
87. 578 S.W.2d at 117. The court noted that plaintiff must also allege and prove that the
requirements of the statute have been met. Thus, under art. 5069-1.03, the pleader satisfies
this condition by pleading and proving a written contract that specifies a sum payable on a
date certain. Id.
88. 578 S.W.2d at 117. This pleading requirement is met when a prayer for damages
"with interest" is made and the pleadings disclose that the damages are definitely established
as of a definite date. See Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 96
(Tex. 1976).
89. 585 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979).
90. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1980) requires that the
petition be filed within 20 days after notice of appeal is given. The 20-day period for filing a
petition is jurisdictional. Clawson v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 475 S.W.2d 735, 737-38
(Tex. 1972).
91. Glidden Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 Tex. 591, 291 S.W.2d 315 (1956).
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it would have been delivered on time but for the deputy district clerk's
conduct.92 The petition was, therefore, timely filed.
VII. LIMITATIONS
Until this year, Texas statutes governing limitation periods treated ac-
tions for debt differently depending upon whether they were founded upon
open or stated accounts, or whether they were evidenced by written con-
tracts.93 By an amendment effective August 27, 1979, however, the Texas
Legislature has provided that all actions for debt are subject to a four-year
limitations period.94 This change brings Texas statutes into conformity
with the four-year limitation period specified in article 2 of the Uniform
Commerical Code 95 and goes beyond the Code to extend the four-year
period to contracts for services. 96
In another statutory enactment, the Texas Legislature added an explicit
two-year statute of limitations to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act.9 7 Effective August 27, 1979, actions brought
under that subchapter must be commenced "within two years after the
date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice occurred
or within two years after the consumer discovered or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the false,
92. 585 S.W.2d at 680-81.
93. Article 5526 formerly provided that actions for debt not evidenced by contracts in
writing or actions upon stated or open accounts had to be commenced within two years after
the cause of action occurred. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act of Limitations § 1, at 627, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 627 (1839). In actions where the indebtedness sued upon was
evidenced by a contract in writing, however, art. 5525 formerly provided a four-year period.
94. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1980) now provides that all
"[aictions for debt" shall be commenced and prosecuted within four years after the cause of
action accrues. Article 5526 has been amended to delete references to actions for debt alto-
gether. 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 716, § 1, at 1768.
95. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
"[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after
the cause of action has accrued." That statute, however, applies only where the contract
involves goods. Id. §§ 2.102, 2.106(a). Even before the amendments to arts. 5526 and 5527,
one Texas court had recognized that actions founded upon open accounts or oral contracts
for the sale of goods were governed by the four-year limitations period specified in § 2.725.
See Smith v. Post-Tensioned Sys., Inc., 537 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
no writ).
96. This change may have the effect of making future actions for statutory damages
subject to a four-year statute of limitations when no limitations period is otherwise specified.
In Rose v. First State Bank, 122 Tex. 298, 59 S.W.2d 810 (1933), the supreme court held that
actions for statutory damages were subject to a two-year statute of limitations because they
were in the nature of actions for debt not founded on written contracts, and thus were gov-
erned by former art. 5526(4). Under the amended version of art. 5526, § 4 has been deleted
and actions for debt not founded on written contracts are governed by the four-year period
specified in art. 5527(1). See note 94 supra.
97. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp. 1980). Section 9 of the
1979 amendments provides that "Nothing in this Act affects either procedurally or substan-
tively a cause of action that arose either in whole or in part prior to the effective date of this
Act." IAI. §17.46. However, the addition of the two-year statute of limitations in § 17.56A
may not work a real change with respect to actions arising before Aug. 27, 1979. In Rose v.
First State Bank, 122 Tex. 298, 59 S.W.2d 810 (1933), the Texas Supreme Court held that in
actions for statutory damages, the statute of limitations is two years. See note 96 supra.
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misleading, or deceptive act or practice. '98 If, however, the consumer
proves that his failure to commence the action within the two-year period
was caused by conduct of the defendant calculated solely to induce the
plaintiff to refrain from or postpone the bringing of an action, an addi-
tional 180 days may be added to the two-year period. 99
VIII. PARTIES
Two cases during the survey period dealt with the obligations imposed
on a person seeking to act on behalf of unnamed parties under rule 42.100
In Smith v. Lewis' °' plaintiffs filed an action on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated. Subsequently, the trial court granted a motion for
summary judgment dismissing the suit without determining whether the
suit could be maintained as a class action. Recognizing that rule 42, as
amended, requires the trial court to make such a determination "as soon as
practical" after the suit's commencement,10 2 the court of civil appeals held
that the rule places an obligation on the trial court to consider class action
maintainability on its own motion. 0 3 Nevertheless, the court held that the
trial court's failure to do so did not violate a substantive right; rather, the
plaintiff has the burden to present his motion for class certification in a
timely manner' °4 and to demonstrate that the case qualifies as a class ac-
tion. ' 05
The importance of fulfilling this latter obligation is well illustrated by
Huddleston v. Western National Bank. 106 In that case the trial court had
dismissed a stockholders' derivative action based on its conclusion that the
plaintiff was an inadequate class representative because he had been a cor-
porate officer at the time of the misconduct alleged in the petition and,
further, had attempted to remove himself from the class by selling his
stock to the defendants. Holding that the trial court had not clearly abused
its discretion, 10 7 the court of civil appeals upheld the finding of inadequate
class representation on the grounds that the trial court could properly have
believed that the plaintiffs interests were antagonistic to those of the
class. 10 8 The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that he had been
98. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp. 1980).
99. Id.
100. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
101. 578 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
102. This provision was added to rule 42 by amendment effective Sept. 1, 1977. TEX. R.
Civ. P. 42(c)(1) (Historical Comment). Although the suit in Smith was filed before that date,
the court held that the amended provision applied retroactively. 578 S.W.2d at 171-72.
103. 578 S.W.2d at 172. The court relied upon the construction that the federal courts
have given the identical portion of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in reach-
ing this conclusion. Id.
104. Id. (citing East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 434 U.S. 810 (1977)).
105. 578 S.W.2d at 172.
106. 577 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ retd n.r.e.).
107. Id. at 780.
108. Id. at 780-81. The court found federal decisions interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 23 to
be "persuasive" in construing rule 42. Consequently, the court took note of the factors con-
sidered by federal courts in their determinations of adequacy of class representation. These
factors were stated to be:
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deprived of a jury trial on the issue of his adequacy as a class representa-
tive, noting that the plaintiff had made no demand for a jury, paid no jury
fee, and participated in the hearing without objection.10 9
IX. DISCOVERY
Two significant statutory developments in the area of privilege occurred
during the survey period. In the new Public Accountancy Act of 1979,' 10
the Texas Legislature created a limited accountant-client privilege. Under
section 26 of that Act a certified public accountant, public accountant, or
entity licensed thereunder'I "shall not be required to disclose or divulge
information which has come into his possession relative to or in connec-
tion with any professional services as [an accountant]"'1 2 without the cli-
ent's permission. ' 3 Further, "[any information derived from or as the
result of such professional services shall be deemed confidential and privi-
leged." 114
Excluded from the scope of the privilege, however, is "information re-
lated to the methods or procedures" used in the preparation of financial
statements, in management advisory or consulting services, and in tax re-
turns and supporting schedules. 1 5 In addition, the Act prohibits the asser-
tion of the privilege in certain proceedings, including "(1) an action against
a licensee by the client or entity engaging the licensee; (2) any disciplinary
investigation or proceeding conducted under or pursuant to this Act; or (3)
any criminal investigation or proceeding."' 16 Moreover, the privilege does
not extend to "documentary information, books or records" in examina-
tions sought by the Comptroller of Public Accounts or any state agency
seeking examination "pursuant to the authority granted by law." 17
Prior to the enactment of section 26, which became effective September
(1) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interests of
the other members of the class; (2) whether his interests are antagonistic in any
way to the interests of those whom he represents; (3) the proportion of those
made parties as compared with the total membership of the class; (4) any other
facts bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the
class.
577 S.W.2d at 780 (citing 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.07[1], at 23-203 (2d ed.
1979)).
A putative class representative's willingness to sacrifice the interests of the class while
pursuing his own advantage was also held fatal to the adequacy of representation require-
ment in Ford v. Bimbo Corp., 512 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974,
no writ).
109. 577 S.W.2d at 781.
110. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-I (Vernon Supp. 1980).
111. This includes professional partnerships and corporations. Id. § 26(a).
112. Id.
113. The Act also allows permission to be given by the "person or entity engaging" the
accountant or "the heirs, successors, or personal representatives of such client or person or
entity." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. §§ 26(a)(l)-(3).
116. Id. §§ 26(b)(l)-(3).
117. Id. § 26(c).
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1, 1979, Texas law did not recognize an accountant-client privilege. 18 Ac-
cordingly, there are as yet no reported Texas decisions construing such
privilege. In enacting section 26, however, Texas joins the minority of
states which have accorded the accountant-client privilege statutory recog-
nition.119 While no accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, 120
the federal rules of evidence make state law applicable "in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision."' 2'
During the survey period, the legislature also added a privilege for com-
munications between a patient and a mental health professional.' 22 The
Act precludes disclosure of communications 123 between a person author-
ized to practice medicine 24 or a person certified to diagnose, evaluate, or
treat mental or emotional disorder 25 and a person who consults such an
individual for diagnosis, treatment, or evaluation of a mental or emotional
disorder. 26 Records of the "identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment"
of the client "created or maintained" by the health professional are also
designated as privileged.' 27
Several types of exceptions to the privilege are, however, expressly cre-
ated. No privilege may be claimed in court proceedings: (1) by the patient
against the professional; 28 (2) when the proceeding is a criminal or license
revocation action in which the patient is a complaining witness; 129 (3)
when the patient waives the privilege in writing;130 (4) when the proceed-
ing is to collect on a claim for services rendered by the professional to the
client; or (5) when the communications are made in a court-ordered exam-
ination and the patient was informed beforehand that no privilege would
attach. 13'
118. See, e.g., United States v. White, 326 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971), a id, 487 F.2d
1335 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
119. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 533 n.22 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
While decisions construing such statutes may be of some value in interpreting § 26, the
various statutes are by no means uniform.
120. See, e.g., United States v. White, 326 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 487 F.2d
1335 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
121. FED. R. EVID. 501. For a discussion of the complexities raised by this rule, see 2
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 501[02], at 501-17 to -20.5 (1979).
122. TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h, §§ 1-6 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
123. Id. § 2(a).
124. Id. § l(a). The person may be authorized by any state or nation to practice
medicine and need not be a psychiatrist.
125. The certification must be given by the State of Texas. Moreover, if the patient "rea-
sonably believes" the person to be authorized to practice medicine or certified to deal with
mental health problems, the communication remains privileged. Id.
126. Id. § 1(b). Alcoholism and drug addiction are included as mental or emotional dis-
orders.
127. Id. § 2(b).
128. Id. § 4(a)(1). Such proceedings include but are not limited to malpractice proceed-
ings.
129. Id. The information must also be relevant to the claim or defense of the profes-
sional in such a proceeding.
130. Id. § 4(a)(2). Such a written waiver may also be submitted by the parent of a minor,
the guardian of an adjudged incompetent, or the personal representative of one deceased.
131. Id. § 4(a)(4). The examination must relate to the patient's mental or emotional con-
[Vol. 34
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
The privilege is also expressly vitiated with respect to disclosures by the
professional: (1) to governmental agencies required or authorized by law
to receive them;' 32 (2) to medical or law enforcement personnel if there
exists probability that the patient may physically harm himself or others or
suffer immediate mental or emotional injury; 133 (3) to qualified personnel
performing management audits, financial audits, program evaluations, or
research; 134 (4) to persons having written consent of the patient or those
having legal authority to act for the patient; 35 (5) to persons or entities
"involved in the payment or collection of fees for mental or emotional
health services;"' 36 or (6) to other professionals participating in the diag-
nosis, evaluation, or treatment of the patient. 137 Once such disclosures are
made, however, the person receiving them may not further disclose them
except for the authorized purposes for which such disclosures were first
obtained. 138
The Act further provides that the patient, or persons authorized by law
to act on his behalf, may claim the privilege.' 39 The professional involved
may also claim the privilege, but only on behalf of the patient.' 40 More-
over, the Act provides that a person aggrieved by a violation of the Act
may seek an injunction or bring a civil action for damages. 4 1
Under prior law, no type of physician-patient privilege existed in
Texas.' 42 In enacting the privilege set forth in article 5561h, Texas joins a
growing number of states that have recognized a privilege for communica-
tions between patients and mental health professionals. 43
The question of privilege was also addressed by the Texas Supreme
Court in Stewart v. McCain.'" The issue there presented was whether ar-
ticle 342-210 of the Texas Banking Code 145 creates an absolute privilege
dition and the communications are not privileged only in so far as they relate to issues of the
patient's mental or emotional health. Before any disclosure can be made, however, the court
must find that the patient was properly informed that the communications would not be
privileged and must impose appropriate safeguards to prevent any unauthorized disclosure.
Id.
132. Id. § 4(b)(1).
133. Id. § 4(b)(2). This determination is left to the professional.
134. Id. § 4(b)(3). In reporting on these activities, the personnel may not disclose "di-
rectly or indirectly" the patient's identity.
135. Id. § 4(b)(4). These include the parent of a minor, the guardian of an adjudged
incompetent, or the personal representative of one deceased.
136. Id. § 4(b)(5). These include corporations and governmental agencies.
137. Id. § 4(b)(6). Personnel under a professional's direction are also within the scope of
this exception.
138. Id. § 2(c). Persons authorized to act on the patient's behalf are not subject to this
restriction.
139. Id. § 3(a).
140. Id. § 3(b). The authority to assert the privilege is presumed in the absence of con-
trary evidence.
141. 1d.§5.
142. See, e.g., Caddo Grocery & Ice v. Carpenter, 285 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1955, no writ). The majority of states have, however, recognized such a privilege.
See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 119, § 2380, at 819 n.5.
143. See 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 119, § 2286, at 75 nn.22b & 23 (Supp. 1979).
144. 575 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1978).
145. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210 (Vernon 1973).
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for information obtained by the Texas Department of Banking relative to
the financial condition of state banks. 146 The attorneys for defendants in a
suit between private parties had served a subpoena duces tecum upon an
assistant examiner of the Texas Department of Banking who had con-
ducted an examination of a state bank. The subpoena sought all docu-
ments relating to that examination, including materials contained in a
confidential section of the examination report. After the examiner refused
to produce the material, and a notice to show cause in connection with
contempt proceedings was issued, the bank examiner sought to have the
supreme court set aside the district court order to show cause. 147
Finding that the legislature had expressly prohibited disclosure of the
information sought, 48 and had made such disclosure a misdemeanor, 49
the court found no exception in the statute for discovery in civil proceed-
ings.' 50 The court also noted that the information sought consisted of
"hunches, opinions and impressions" of the examiner which would "sel-
dom, if ever, be competent or admissible evidence."15'
In Werner v. Miller152 the Texas Supreme Court again considered dis-
covery of information concerning experts under rule 168.153 The plaintiff
had filed interrogatories requesting the names of those experts the defend-
ants had consulted who would be called as witnesses at trial; in addition,
plaintiff sought the names of consulting experts who might be called as
witnesses as well as those the defendant had not yet decided upon call-
ing. 154 The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to compel answers to those
interrogatories and the defendant sought an order compelling both parties
to designate only testifying experts by a date to be set by the trial court.
The trial court denied the former motion and granted the latter, 15 where-
146. Article 342-210 of the Texas Banking Code provides in pertinent part:
[A]ll information obtained by the Banking Department relative to the
financial condition of state banks, whether obtained through examination or
otherwise, except published statements, and all files and records of said De-
partment relative thereto shall be confidential, and shall not be disclosed by
the Commissioner or any officer or employee of said Department.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210 (Vernon 1973).
147. The court had previously denied the examiner leave to file a petition for writ of
mandamus seeking to vacate the order of the trial court denying the examiner's motion for
protective order. 575 S.W.2d at 510.
148. Id. The court recognized the power of the legislature to exempt materials from
discovery and held itself obligated to apply the statute as written.
149. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-211 (Vernon 1973).
150. 575 S.W.2d at 511. See also TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-147 (1976) (information held
pursuant to art. 342-210 not subject to Texas Open Records Act).
151. 575 S.W.2d at 511.
152. 579 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1979).
153. TEX. R. Ctv. P. 168. This rule allows discovery by interrogatory of any information
discoverable by deposition under rule 186a. Rule 186a allows discovery of "the identity and
location of. . . persons, including experts, having knowledge of relevant facts," but allows
discovery of "the reports, factual observations and opinions of an expert" only if he "will be
called as a witness." TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a.
154. 579 S.W.2d at 457.
155. Id. at 456. Under the order, the party setting the case trial was required to designate
testifying experts 30 days prior to filing the written trial setting. The other party then had
two days to designate its testifying experts.
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upon the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus.156
A majority of the supreme court upheld the action of the trial court,
finding no abuse of discretion. Characterizing the principal question
presented to be "at what stage a party must 'positively aver' that an expert
consultant will not be a witness,"' 157 the majority viewed the trial court's
order as one that was well within its discretion in supervising the conduct
of discovery. 58 Disposing of the plaintiff's contention that the trial court
had abused its discretion by denying discovery of the identity of consulting
experts, the majority relied upon Boyles v. Houston Lighting & Power
Co.,159 stating that such information is "irrelevant and immaterial."'' 60
In a strong dissent, Justice McGee 16' pointed out that Boyles had ad-
dressed only the admissibility of the identity of consulting experts as evi-
dence.162 Examining rule 186a, 163 the dissent found that only the written
statements, factual observations, mental impressions, and opinions of con-
sulting experts qualify for the work product exception incorporated into
the rule. 164 Further, the dissent noted that prior opinions of the supreme
court' 65 had held that a party was entitled to a "positive averment" as to
whether an expert would fulfill only a consulting role. 166 Thus, in the dis-
senter's view, an interrogatory may "properly inquire into the identity and
location, as well as the testifying or consulting capacity, of any expert pos-
sessing knowledge of relevant facts."'' 67
The question of appropriate sanctions for failure to supplement properly
a designation of a testifying expert was addressed in Trubell v. Patten. 68
In an action against an attorney for professional malpractice, the defend-
ant, by interrogatories, requested the plaintiff to designate the names of
testifying experts; in response, the plaintiff stated that he knew of no such
156. For a discussion of the use of mandamus to review discovery orders, see Comment,
The Expanding Use of Mandamus to Review Texas District Court Discovery Orders. An Im-
mediate Appeal isAvailable, 32 Sw. L.J. 1283 (1979); Note, Mandamus-Discovery-Mandamus
May Issue to Compel a District Judge to Order Discovery, 9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 782 (1978).
157. 579 S.W.2d at 456. The majority merely passed over the question of how a party
could "positively aver" that a particular consultant would not be used as a testifying witness
if his name had never been revealed in the first instance. Apparently the majority viewed a
designation limited to the names of testifying experts as the equivalent of such an averment.
The opinion appears to run counter to the thrust of such opinions as Barker v. Dunham, 551
S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977), in which the burden was placed upon the party resisting discovery to
justify the application of the "work product" exception. See Figari, supra note 24, at 416-17.
158. The majority expressed its concern "over the great loss of time and judicial re-
sources through 'discovery gamesmanship.'" 579 S.W.2d at 457.
159. 464 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. 1971).
160. 579 S.W.2d at 456.
161. Justices Pope, Johnson, and Campbell also joined in the dissent. 579 S.W.2d at 457.
162. As the dissent pointed out, information sought need not be admissible at trial so
long as it is reasonably calculated to relate to admissible evidence. 579 S.W.2d at 458 (citing
TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a).
163. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a.
164. 579 S.W.2d at 459.
165. Id. (citing Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W 2d 798 (Tex. 1977); Barker v. Dunham, 551
S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977)).
166. 579 S.W.2d at 459.
167. Id.
168. 582 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
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experts, but agreed to supplement his response prior to trial. Although the
plaintiff had subsequently designated experts, he had withdrawn the desig-
nations on each occasion after a continuance was obtained and the desig-
nated persons were deposed. At trial, the plaintiff sought to elicit expert
testimony from a fact witness who had never been designated as an ex-
pert. 169 The trial court excluded the expert testimony and subsequently
directed a verdict for defendant. 70
On appeal, the court of civil appeals noted that while rule 168 expressly
requires supplementation of interrogatory answers,171 it provides specific
sanctions only for refusal to answer any or all of such interrogatories. 172
Because Texas practice regarding supplementation of discovery derives
from the federal rules, 173 however, the court saw no reason to depart from
the federal practice that allows sanctions for failure to supplement.1 74
Having filled the gap in the Texas rules by holding that the trial court had
the power to impose sanctions in the instant situation, 75 the court consid-
ered whether the exclusion of evidence in the case before it constituted an
abuse of discretion. 176 Finding that the plaintiff had agreed to supplement
his expert designations, had never designated the expert in question, had
denied prior to trial that he would call experts, and had never sought a
continuance, the court found no abuse in the trial court's ruling. 177
The propriety of imposing sanctions for failure to answer interrogatories
in the absence of a prior order compelling such answers was before the
court of civil appeals in Illinois Employers Insurance Co. v. Lewis. 178 In
that case the plaintiff had filed a motion to impose sanctions under rules
169. Although the defendant had deposed the witness, he argued that he had deposed
him merely as a fact witness. Id. at 609.
170. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff admitted that without expert testimony, he had no basis
to request the submission of issues regarding professional negligence to the jury. Id. at 611.
171. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168 requires supplementation if a party obtains information upon
the basis of which "he knows that the answer [to the interrogatory] though correct when
made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the answer is
in substance a knowing concealment." In Trubell the plaintiff may have been in literal com-
pliance with rule 168 since he did not even inquire into the witness's willingness to give an
expert opinion until after trial had begun. Nevertheless, he had agreed to designate any
testifying experts prior to trial. Such an agreement itself imposes a duty under rule 168.
172. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215a. Rule 215a includes among the appropriate sanctions
exclusion of evidence offered by the noncomplying party.
173. 582 S.W.2d at 611 (citing Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955)).
The federal version of the duty to supplement is incorporated in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
174. See Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States Appendix 2: Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, Advisory Com-
mittee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D.
487, 508 (1970).
175. This holding appears to conflict with that of Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Thomas, 517 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court
did not abuse discretion in refusing to grant mistrial after plaintiff neglected to supplement).
176. The imposition of sanctions by a trial court for failure or refusal of a party to com-
ply with discovery rules can be set aside only when there has been a clear abuse of discre-
tion. 582 S.W.2d at 610.
177. Id. at 61I.
178. 582 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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168 and 215a 179 for defendant's failure to answer interrogatories. 180 The
defendant filed its answers fifteen minutes prior to trial, but the trial court
nevertheless granted the motion for sanctions by ordering the defendant's
answers stricken and a default judgment entered. The reviewing court first
noted that the purpose of sanctions is to secure compliance with the dis-
covery rule rather than to punish erring parties. 8 1 Emphasizing that sub-
jecting a party to a default judgment constitutes an extremely harsh
remedy,' 82 the court stated that it had found no cases in which such a
sanction had been imposed in the absence of a refusal to comply with an
order of the court compelling the filing of interrogatory answers. 183 Thus,
while acknowledging that rule 215a(c) does not "literally require a party to
obtain an order compelling answers to interrogatories before moving for
sanctions,"' 84 the court found it incumbent upon the party seeking sanc-
tions to obtain such an order and to show a refusal to obey before sanc-
tions could properly be imposed.' 85
The availability of discovery by depositions after trial was rejected in
Swearingen v. Swearingen.18 6 After an adverse jury verdict in a child cus-
tody proceeding, the father sought to take notice depositions for use in a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Al-
though the court found no rule or case prohibiting the taking of post-trial
depositions, 8 7 it nevertheless concluded that "the authorities assume that
if depositions are to be taken, it should be done before or during trial for
use during the trial."' 188
Finally, supplementing rule 167a,' 89 section 13.02(a) of the Family
Code' 90 now not only permits blood testing of parties in a paternity suit,
but requires it. Under that section, the court "shall order the mother, al-
leged father, and child to submit to the taking of blood."' 9' The court is
179. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168, 215a.
180. The defendant had filed responses to requests for admission covering the same sub-
ject matter sought by the interrogatories, but as a result of counsel's absence from the coun-
try, had simply failed to answer any of the interrogatories. 582 S.W.2d at 244.
181. Id. at 245.
182. Id. Nevertheless, rule 215a explicitly authorizes sanctions striking pleadings, de-
priving a party of his grounds for defense, or entering judgment by default.
183. See cases cited at 582 S.W.2d at 245.
184. 582 S.W.2d at 245. Rule 215a requires an order compelling answers only where a
party fails to answer some, but not all, of the interrogatories.
185. Id. For a discussion of the standards governing discovery sanctions see Comment,
Imposition and Selection of Sanctions in Texas Pretrial Discovery Procedure, 31 BAYLOR L.
REV. 191 (1979).
186. 578 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd). A similar
result with respect to interrogatories was reached in Ana-Log, Inc. v. City of Tyler, 520
S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
187. 578 S.W.2d at 833.
188. Id. The court did not, however, identify the authorities relied upon. TEX. R. Civ.
P. 621a specifically authorizes post-trial discovery, but only by the successful party in aid of
enforcement of judgment.
189. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a.
190. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
191. Id. No showing of good cause is necessary.
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also given power to appoint experts to conduct the tests. 192
X. DISMISSAL
The dangers in failing to prosecute a suit diligently are highlighted by
the harsh result reached in Harris County v. Miller. 93 In that case, the
Texas Supreme Court considered the power of a trial court to reinstate a
case under rule 165a194 after dismissing it for want of prosecution. Three
and one half years after the suit in question had been filed, the trial court
placed it on the automatic dismissal docket and notified the plaintiff's at-
torney. Although the plaintiffs attorney filed a motion to retain the case
on the docket and obtained a trial setting, the trial court was not informed
of these actions and signed an order dismissing the case for want of prose-
cution. The plaintiffs attorney was unaware of the dismissal order until he
received a copy of the defendant's motion to strike the trial setting one
month after the dismissal order was signed. He immediately moved to
reinstate the case, and the trial court granted that motion several days
later.
Recognizing that rule 165a, which governs the reinstatement jurisdiction
of the courts, specifies different periods for reinstatement, depending upon
when a party or his attorney receives notice, 195 the supreme court held that
notice of the trial court's intent to dismiss bars reinstatement at any time
after thirty days from the order of dismissal. 96 So long as that notice is
received prior to the expiration of twenty days after the actual dismissal,
the fact that notice of the actual order of dismissal is not received until
later is irrelevant. Although the plaintiff in Miller had no notice of the
actual dismissal until thirty days after entry of the order, the court found
that he had notice of the trial court's intent to dismiss before the order was
even signed. This being the operative date under the rule, the trial court
had no jurisdiction to reinstate after thirty days from the order of dismis-
sal. The plaintiffs filing of a motion to reinstate within the thirty-day pe-
riod was found to be insufficient to satisfy the rule's requirement that
actual reinstatement must occur in that period. 197
XI. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The effect of the 1978 amendments to rule 166-A,19 8 which governs sum-
192. Id. § 13.03(a).
193. 576 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1979).
194. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
195. 576 S.W.2d at 810-11 (citing Danforth Memorial Hosp. v. Harris, 573 S.W.2d 762
(Tex. 1978)). Reinstatement must take place either within 30 days from the date of dismissal
or within 30 days after the party or his attorney receives notice. In no event, however, may
the court reinstate under rule 165a more than six months after the dismissal; the remedy in
that situation is a bill of review.
196. 576 S.W.2d at 810-11.
197. Id. at 811.
198. TEX. R. Clv. P. 166-A. The amendments to rule 166-A included: (a) expanding the
time for filing the motion from 10 days to 21 days before the time specified for the hearing;
(b) expanding the time for a response to the motion from prior to the day of the hearing to
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mary judgment practice, has been the subject of a number of opinions,
including the significant supreme court decision of City ofHouston v. Clear
Creek Basin Authority. 99 In that case the defendant city filed a motion for
summary judgment, and at the time of the hearing on the motion, the only
issue presented to the trial court was whether the plaintiff had standing to
sue for violations of chapter twenty-six of the Texas Water Code2°° that
had occurred outside the plaintiffs jurisdictional boundaries. Ruling on
this single issue, the trial court granted the city's motion. The court of civil
appeals reversed, finding that the allegations of violations within the plain-
tiff's territorial boundaries gave rise to a fact issue.20' Relying on the re-
cently added language of rule 166-A that requires the movant to establish
that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law "on the issues as ex-
pressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other response" 202 and
provides that "[ilssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written
motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as
grounds for reversal, ' 20 3 the supreme court held that the court of civil ap-
peals erred in considering an issue that was not presented to the trial court
and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Under the supreme court's interpretation of the rule, "both the reasons
for the summary judgment and the objections to it must be in writing and
before the trial court at the hearing. ' '2°4 Further, in order to ensure appel-
late review of an issue, the issue must be "expressly presented" in "written
motions, written answers or written responses to the motion. ' 20 5 The term
"answer," the court emphasized, means "an answer to the motion, not an
answer generally filed in response to a petition.'' 2°6 Finally, the supreme
court noted that the nonmovant need not file an answer or response to the
motion to argue on appeal that the movant's summary judgment proof is
legally insufficient. 20 7 If the nonmovant pursues this course, however, he
will be precluded from raising "any other issues as grounds for reversal,"
seven days prior to the day of hearing; (c) requiring that issues related to the motion be
expressly presented to the trial court in the written motion, answer or other reponse, see
notes 199-226 infra and accompanying text; (d) allowing expert testimony under certain cir-
cumstances in support of the motion, see notes 222-25 infra and accompanying text; (e)
allowing testimonial evidence of an interested witness; and (f) providing that defects in affi-
davits and attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by
objection. See Figari, supra note 24, at 407, 418-19.
199. 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979). For a discussion of current summary judgment prac-
tice and the Clear Creek decision, see Hittner, Summary Judgments in Texas, 43 TEx. B.J. 11
(1980).
200. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.268 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
201. 589 S.W.2d at 674.
202. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
203. Id.
204. 589 S.W.2d at 677.
205. Id. The court also noted that the issues could be restricted or expanded by written
agreement of the parties or by the parties' agreement on the record in open court pursuant to
TEX. R. Civ. P. 11. 589 S.W.2d at 67. The court therefore approved the parties' agreement
made on the record in open court that restricted the hearing to the single issue of violations
occurring within the plaintiff's boundaries. 589 S.W.2d at 677-78.
206. Id. at 677.
207. Id. at 678.
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including issues that relate to reasons for "avoiding" the movant's right to
summary judgment 208 Thus, defenses of an affirmative nature, which are
covered by rules 93209 and 94,210 would have to be asserted in a written
document by the nonmovant to be considered on appeal.211
Although decided before Clear Creek, two decisions by the Dallas court
of civil appeals, Combs P. Fantastic Homes, Inc. 212 and Sherman v. Da-
pis, 2 13 are in accord with the rationale of that opinion. In Combs the trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a suit
under the Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act 214 because
the plaintiffs deposition testimony established as a matter of law that the
defendant had not acted with intent to deceive the plaintiff. Although he
had failed to file any response or answer to the motion, the plaintiff con-
tended on appeal that the trial court erred because questions of fact existed
on the issue of the defendant's intent and on the issue of negligent misrep-
resentation. The court held that the issue of the defendant's intent could
be raised on appeal since that ground had been asserted by the defendant-
movant in its motion and, therefore, had been expressly presented to the
trial court. 215 The issue of negligent misrepresentation, however, could not
be considered because that issue had not been "presented to the trial court
by either party.' '216 Similarly, in Sherman the nonmovant plaintiff failed
to file a response or answer to the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment that was based on the applicable statute of limitations. The appellate
court held that the plaintiff could attack the sufficiency of the proof that
the defendant had offered to show that the limitations period had run. The
court reiterated that "the party opposing a motion for summary judgment
need not file a written answer or other response in order to raise for appel-
late consideration the insufficiency of the summary-judgment proof to sup-
port the specific grounds stated in the motion. '217
To be compared with the foregoing authorities is the supreme court's
208. Id.
209. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93.
210. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
211. 589 S.W.2d at 679. As examples of the types of cases in which the nonmovants must
expressly raise certain issues in order to preserve appellate consideration, the supreme court
cited Torres v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1970) (existence of good cause
for late filing of worker's compensation claim) and Gardner v. Martin, 162 Tex. 156, 345
S.W.2d 274 (1961) (failure of movant to attach certified copies of prior case to establish res
judicata). 589 S.W.2d at 679.
The supreme court also pointed out that under the new version of rule 166-A, the trial
court is encouraged to use the summary judgment in appropriate cases. Id. at 676. In the
court's view, the pre-1978 summary judgment rule had "a chilling effect on the willingness
of trial courts to utilize the intended benefits of the procedure." Id. See generall, McDon-
ald, The Effective Use of Summary Judgment, 15 Sw. L.J. 365 (1961); Comment, Summary
Judgment in Texas.- A Selective Survey, 14 Hous. L. REV. 854 (1977).
212. 584 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
213. 583 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
214. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
215. 584 S.W.2d at 343-44.
216. Id. at 344.
217. 583 S.W.2d at 924.
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decision in Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Alvarez.2 18 In that case the
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment that failed to set out the
grounds for the motion as required by rule 166-A(c).21 9 After the motion
was granted, the plaintiff raised this defect for the first time in her brief on
appeal. Analogizing to the rule that defects in pleadings are waived unless
specifically pointed out by written motion or exception before the charge
to the jury or rendition of judgment,22 0 the supreme court held that the
failure of the movant to specify grounds in his motion was "a defect in
form" that was "waived unless excepted to prior to rendition of judg-
ment.",
22 1
Pursuant to the 1978 amendments to rule 166-A, "[a] summary judg-
ment may be based on uncontroverted testimonal evidence. . . of an ex-
pert witness as to subject matter concerning which the trier of fact must be
guided solely by the opinion testimony of experts" provided such "evi-
dence is [1 clear, positive and direct, [2] otherwise credible and free from
contradictions and inconsistencies, and [3] could have been readily contro-
verted. ' 22 2 Relying on this language, the court in Walkoviak v. Hilton Ho-
tels Corp. 223 held that an expert's opinion can be used to defeat, as well as
support, a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the appellate
court ruled that the trial court had erred in granting a motion for summary
judgment, because the nonmovant had filed an affidavit of his expert,
which created an issue of fact.224 Overruling the movant's contention that
the expert's affidavit was insufficient because it was based on "the best of
his knowledge and belief' rather than personal knowledge, the court
found that movant had waived this point by failing to object at the sum-
mary judgment hearing. 225
Section (e) of rule 166-A 226 provides in part that "[s]worn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith." In Dallas County State Bank v.
218. 576 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1978).
219. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
220. TEX. R. Civ. P. 90.
221. 576 S.W.2d at 773. See also Life Ins. Co. v. Gar-Dal, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.
1978). Assuming the movant files a motion for summary judgment in general terms and the
nonmovant files no reponse or answer, the question arises as to what grounds the nonmov-
ant may raise on appeal. The court in Combs v. Fantastic Homes, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 340, 343
n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r,e.) suggested that a motion in general terms
would allow "the appellate court to consider any issue that would be negated by the general
language asserted in the motion."
222. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c). Prior to 1978 expert testimony, even if uncontroverted,
would not establish a fact as a matter of law for purposes of summary judgment. See Gibbs
v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. 1970); Broussard v. Moon, 431 S.W.2d
534, 537 (Tex. 1968).
223. 580 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. Id. at 626.
225. Id. at 626-27. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e) states that "[dlefects in the form of affidavits
or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection
by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend." The court found that this
provision was applicable to affidavits that either "establish" or "preclude" a movant's right
to summary judgment. 580 S.W.2d at 627.
226. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
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Thies 227 the plaintiff sought to collect on a delinquent promissory note.
Filing a motion for summary judgment together with supporting affidavits,
the plaintiff requested the court to enter judgment in its favor for the face
amount of the note less the amount offset by the plaintiff because of the
defendant's pledge agreement. Although the plaintiff failed to attach a
sworn or certified copy of the pledge agreement to the affidavits, the
supreme court held that reversal was not required because the missing
pledge agreement did not "pertain to an element of the movant's suit" but
was only a "part of what should have been an affirmative defense. '228
Claude Regis Vargo Enterprises, Inc. v. Bacarisse229 concerned the pro-
priety of an amendment to the pleadings after a summary judgment con-
test. Rule 63, which governs the filing of amendments, provides that the
parties to an action may amend their pleadings as a matter of right until
"within seven days of the date of trial. '230 Holding that a hearing on a
motion for summary judgment is a trial within the meaning of rule 63,231
the court of civil appeals concluded that the trial court committed no error
in disregarding an amended petition filed after the date of hearing because
leave to amend had not been sought.232
Contending that he had received no advance notice of a summary judg-
ment hearing, the plaintiff in Lofthus v. Stale233 attempted to set aside a
summary judgment entered against him. Finding that plaintiff's counsel
had attended the hearing and had been afforded additional time to file
opposing affidavits but had failed to do so, the court of civil appeals con-
cluded that plaintiff was barred from challenging the judgment for lack of
advance notice of the hearing date.23 4
XII. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
The opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Turner v. General Motors
Corp. 235 is a guidebook to the submission of an automobile crashworthi-
ness case to a jury. Proclaiming that "in the trial of strict liability cases
involving design defects the issue and accompanying instruction will not
include either the element of the ordinary consumer or of the prudent
manufacturer," 236 the court concluded that henceforth "[tihe jury may be
instructed in general terms to consider the utility of the product and the
227. 575 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1978).
228. Id. at 21. See also Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Larue, 367 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.
1963).
229. 578 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
230. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.
231. 578 S.W.2d at 529; accord Mainland Sav. Ass'n v. Wilson, 545 S.W.2d 491, 493
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, no writ); Bruce v. McAdoo, 531 S.W.2d 354, 356
(Tex. Civ App.-El Paso 1975, no writ); Jones v. Houston Materials Co., 477 S.W.2d 694,
695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ).
232. 578 S.W.2d at 529.
233. 572 S.W.2d at 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
234. Id. at 800 (citing Chalkley v. Ashley, 392 S.W.2d 752, 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1965, no writ)).
235. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
236. Id. at 847.
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risks involved in its use."' 237 As formulated by the court, the submission
should read as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time
the [product] in question was manufactured by [the manufacturer] the
[product] was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a
product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into con-
sideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use.
Answer "We do" or "We do not. '238
Worthy of note also is the Turner court's refusal to permit a jury instruc-
tion that any award of damages is not subject to federal taxation. Reaf-
firming its earlier decision on the point,239 the supreme court held that
such a submission would be improper because it would introduce a wholly
collateral matter into the damage issue.240
Under former practice the trial judge was required to frame his charge
so as to "not therein comment on the weight of the evidence."' 24 ' This
phrase was deleted by the 1973 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, 242 and the trial judge is now only prohibited from commenting
directly on the weight of the evidence.243 While this amendment relaxed
the standard applicable in this area, the court in City of Beaumont v.
Fuentez244 reiterated that a submission to the jury that assumes a disputed
fact is never a permissible comment on the weight of the evidence and
constitutes reversible error.245
Several decisions of courts of civil appeals during the survey period fo-
cused on the scope of submission of special issues under rule 277.246 Abol-
ishing the former requirement that special issues be submitted distinctly
and separately, 247 rule 277 now provides that "[i]t shall be discretionary
with the court whether to submit separate questions with respect to each
element of a case or to submit issues broadly," and that "[ilt shall not be
objectionable that a question is general or includes a combination of ele-
ments or issues.' ' 248 Giving this language full effect, the court in Del lonte
Corp. v. Martin249 approved the submission in a breach of contract action
237. Id.
238. Id. at 847 n. 1.
239. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956).
240. 584 S.W.2d at 853. But see Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 295-97
(9th Cir. 1975).
241. Tex. R. Civ. P. 272 (Vernon 1967).
242. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272; see Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 36 TEX. B.J. 594 (1973).
243. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
244. 582 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
245. Id. at 224-25; accord, Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams, 525 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
246. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
247. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 1967). See generally Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111
Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
248. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. See Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Ver-
dict Systemfor Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973). See also Pope & Lowerre, The State of the
Special Verdict-1979, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1979).
249. 574 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
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of a single issue inquiring whether the "plaintiff substantially complied
with the terms of the contract" in the place of seven issues concerning the
same subject matter. 250
In contrast, the court in Harville v. Sieben/ist251 found improper an issue
inquiring whether "the manner in which [the defendant] operated his vehi-
cle on the occasion in question" was grossly negligent. 252 Although the
plaintiff had pleaded that the defendant was grossly negligent in three dis-
tinct respects, the court observed that the evidence raised the issue only as
to speed. Adhering to a recent decision of the supreme court, 253 the court
of civil appeals reversed the trial court because the submitted issues did
not restrict the jury's determination of gross negligence to the single act
that was pleaded and supported by the evidence. 254
Finally, the court in American Transfer and Storage Co. v. Brown255 con-
demned the special issues submitted by the trial court in a suit to recover
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act.256
Relying on Spradling v. Williams,257 the court held that the special issues
in a deceptive trade practices suit must inquire into the occurrence of the
specific acts or practices alleged in the petition.258 Further, if an act or
practice does not fall within any of the twenty subdivisions of section
17.46(b) of the Act, an additional issue must be submitted asking whether
the specific act or practice alleged is a deceptive trade practice. 259 In the
case at bar the issues did not inquire about specific facts but merely re-
peated the language of two subdivisions of section 17.46(b) of the Act. 260
Thus the jury members were improperly asked a legal question without
appropriate instructions. Although conceding that instructions might cure
the defect in the submission of a legal question, the court stated that the
"better practice is . . . to submit to the jury issues concerning the particu-
lar act or practice alleged to have been false, misleading, or deceptive."' 26'
Rule 273, which concerns requested submissions, stipulates that "[a] re-
quest by either party for any instructions, special issues, definitions or ex-
planatory instructions shall be made separate and apart from such party's
objections to the court's charge. ' 262 Texas Employers' Insurance Associa-
tion v. Eskue 263 is a warning to the trial practitioner that the rule should
250. Id. at 598.
251. 582 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ granted).
252. Id. at 624.
253. Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978), discussedin
Note, Special Issue Submission Under Revised Rule 277: Scott v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway, 32 Sw. L.J. 859 (1978).
254. 582 S.W.2d at 624.
255. 584 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ granted).
256. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
257. 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978).
258. 584 S.W.2d at 294-95.
259. Id. at 295.
260. d. at 295-96. The court questioned whether the defendant had violated TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (7) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
261. 584 S.W.2d at 295-96.
262. TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
263. 574 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
[Vol. 34
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
not be taken lightly. Following an earlier case,264 the court concluded that
the failure of a party to submit requests separate from his objections to the
charge results in a waiver and precludes appellate review of the trial
court's failure to give the request. 265
XIII. JURY PRACTICE
Although rule 233266 provides that "[e]ach party to a civil suit shall be
entitled to six peremptory challenges in a case tried in the district court,"
the fact that a person is named as a party to a suit does not in itself entitle
him to six peremptory challenges. 267 In order for two defendants to be
entitled to more than six peremptory challenges between them, the inter-
ests of those defendants must be antagonistic on an issue with which the
jury is concerned. 268 Article 2151 a,2 6 9 interacting with rule 233, states that
"[ajfter proper alignment of parties, it shall be the duty of the court to
equalize the number of peremptory challenges provided under Rule 233
. . . in accordance with the ends of justice so that no party is given an
unequal advantage." Resolving a conflict in the courts of appeals as to
whether each side must be allowed an equal number of peremptory chal-
lenges, 270 the supreme court in Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn27' concluded
that article 2151a does not require numerical equality. The plaintiff
brought a products liability and negligence action against four defendants
who each claimed that the sole cause of the plaintiffs injuries was the
other defendants' acts or omissions. Finding that the necessary antago-
nism existed among the defendants, the trial court awarded each defend-
ant six peremptory challenges. Rejecting the argument that article 2151 a
requires numerical equality for the number of challenges allowed each
side, the supreme court nevertheless ruled that the trial court had commit-
ted error in permitting a four-to-one disparity in the number of peremp-
tory challenges alloted to plaintiff and defendants. 272 Recognizing that the
264. Templeton v. Unigard Security Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1977).
265. 574 S.W.2d at 818.
266. TEX. R. Civ. P. 233.
267. See, e.g., Retail Credit Co. v. Hyman, 316 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1958, writ ref'd). If a group of litigants have essentially common interests and are not antag-
onistic on an issue of fact, they are considered to be only one "party" under rule 233. Per-
kins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. 1974).
268. Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1973)
269. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2151a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
270. Compare Dunn v. Patterson Dental Co., 578 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana), afy'd on other grounds, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127 (Dec. 22, 1979) with Thomas v. Oil &
Gas Bldg., Inc., 582 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
King v. Maldonado, 552 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.);
Dean v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 538 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ); Austin
Road Co. v. Evans, 499 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
271. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127 (Dec. 22, 1979).
272. Id. at 130. The supreme court did refer to a number of court of civil appeals cases
which held that a two-to-one ratio was not an improper disparity. Id. See Longoria v.
Atlantic Gulf Enterprises, 577 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d
n.r.e.); King v. Maldonado, 552 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App --Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Dean v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 538 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ);
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statute requires the trial court to equalize strikes between the "parties"
rather than the "sides" of the suit, the supreme court emphasized that the
duty of the trial court under article 2151 a is to "equalize the positions of
the parties to prevent one side, antagonistic among the parties on certain
matters of fact with which the jury would be concerned but primarily
united in their opposition to the other side, from selecting the jury. ' 2 7 3
According to the court, the proportionalizing of the strikes "may be ac-
complished by increasing the number alloted a sole party on one side, by
decreasing the number alloted the multiple parties on the other side, or by
both. 274
Three opinions during the survey period addressed the propriety of final
jury argument. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese275 counsel for the
defendant argued to the jury that the plaintiffs attorney, to make his cli-
ent's claim more valuable, had concocted a "sham or plot" that required
the plaintiff to drive past "a thousand doctors" on his way to find one who
would cooperate by providing unnecessary treatment and inflating the
plaintiffs medical bills.276 Reversing the court of civil appeals decision
that had found such argument to be improper and prejudicial, 277 the
supreme court held that the argument was not improper because "there
was direct evidence, as well as inferences from the evidence, which sup-
ported the argument. '278 Further, plaintiffs counsel had failed to make an
objection or to request an instruction for the jury to disregard the argu-
ment, and the supreme court concluded that the case was not one of the
"rare instances" in which incurable harm from an improper argument had
occurred. 279 One of those rare instances, however, arose in Fortenberry v.
Fortenberry,280 which was a suit to cancel a will and a mineral deed.
Counsel for the contestants to the instruments implied in his closing argu-
ment that the signatures on the documents were forgeries, and he also
stated that the proponents for the will were "vultures" who were "circling
in the air" and who had "swooped down" on the testatrix at the time she
executed the documents.28 1 Moreover, he asked the jury to consider
"whose grandmother" and "aunt" were "next. '282 Notwithstanding the
trial court's action in sustaining objections to all the foregoing argument,
the court of civil appeals held that the harm from such argument was in-
Austin Road Co. v. Evans, 499 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App -Forth Worth 1973, writ refd
n.r.e.).
273. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 129. See generally Sheehan & Hollingsworth, Allocation of
Peremptory Challenges Among Multiple Parties, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 511 (1979).
274. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 129-30.
275. 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979).
276. Id. at 836.
277. Reese v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 567 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), rep'd, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1979).
278. 584 S.W.2d at 837.
279. Id. at 839-41.
280. 582 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




curable. 283 In Fulmer v. Thompson284 the plaintiffs counsel suggested that
a witness had testified favorably for the defendant "because of some green
stuff that comes out of your pocket back here. ' 285 Holding that the de-
fendant's objection to such argument should have been sustained, the
court of civil appeals decided that the statement constituted reversible er-
ror.
286
In order to ensure that an action is tried before a jury, a demand must be
made and the appropriate fee paid not less than ten days before the date
set for trial.287 In Childs v. Reunion Bank288 demand was made seven days
before the trial setting. Recognizing that the trial court had the discretion
to deny an untimely jury demand, 289 the court held that the appellant had
failed to carry his burden of proving an abuse of that discretion because
the record did not reflect "any of the circumstances surrounding the denial
except that the request was denied. ' 290 Similarly, in Guff Insurance Co. v.
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. ,291 a jury demand was not filed until the date
of trial. Notwithstanding the availability of a jury panel, the court of civil
appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of a jury
trial. The court of appeals based this holding on the trial court's findings
that the case had been set for several months on the non-jury docket, a jury
trial would disrupt the court's business, and the underlying motivation for
the request was to obtain a continuance. 292
When jury misconduct is asserted in a motion for new trial, the rule has
long prevailed in Texas that the movant must establish probable harm as
well as the existence of material misconduct. 293 An example of the appli-
cation of this rule is found in City of Houston v. Simon.294 In that case, a
copy of the court's charge belonging to the plaintiffs attorney, which also
included his handwritten notations, was mistakenly delivered to the jury
during its deliberation. Although finding that such action was in violation
283. Id.
284. 573 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
285. Id. at 264 (emphasis removed).
286. Id. at 266-67. For cases holding that an argument suggesting that a witness was
paid to testify is reversible error when the witness has not been impeached and nothing in
the record supports the suggestion, see Cross v. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co., 351
S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ reed n.r.e.); Rogers v. Broughton, 250
S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ retd n.r.e.); Airline Motor Coaches, Inc. v.
Campbell, 184 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App -Beaumont 1944, writ retd w.o.m.).
287. TEx. R. Civ. P. 216.
288. 587 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ filed).
289. Id. at 471. The court did note, however, that "a party has a right to a trial by jury
even though the jury fee is paid late, if a jury panel is available, unless it causes a postpone-
ment of the trial and unless it causes an undue interference with the handling of other busi-
ness of the court." Id. See also Erback v. Donald, 170 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1943, writ retd w.o.m.).
290. 587 S.W.2d at 471.
291. 584 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
292. Id. at 889. But see Aronoff v. Texas Turnpike Auth., 299 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1957, no writ).
293. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327. See generally Pope, Jury Misconduct andHarm, 12 BAYLOR L.
REV. 355 (1960).
294. 580 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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of rule 281,295 the court held that prejudicial harm could not be presumed
and that no grounds for reversal had been established. 296
The final development in the area of jury practice is the amendment of
article 2135.297 In apparent recognition of the discriminatory treatment of
male parents and guardians, the legislature amended the statute so that
"all persons" who have legal custody of children under the age of ten years
may be exempted from jury service if the service would leave the children
of such persons without adequate supervision.298
XIV. JUDGMENT
Stoner v. Thompson,299 a case involving a post-answer default judgment,
dealt with the sufficiency of the plaintiffs pleadings to support the judg-
ment. The original plaintiff, Stoner, took a nonsuit after two parties, the
Malkans and Texas Media, had intervened seeking various forms of relief
against him. On the morning of the trial, Stoner's attorney appeared solely
for the purpose of urging a special appearance under rule 120a and, after
that motion was denied, withdrew. Thereafter, the Malkans obtained
leave to file a trial amendment asking for declaratory relief. After trial,
judgment was entered against the original plaintiff Stoner in favor of the
Malkans and Texas Media.3°°
The appellant, Stoner, attacked the award of money damages to Texas
Media as being unsupported by the pleadings, which at the time of his
withdrawal contained only claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.
Noting that Texas Media had never alleged that it had sustained money
damages, nor stated a prayer for such relief, the court held that Stoner did
not have "fair notice" that such relief might be awarded. 30' The general
prayer "for such other and further relief to which plaintiff . . . may show
himself entitled" was insufficient to enlarge the pleading to embrace an
entirely different cause of action of which Stoner had no fair notice.30 2
The court further rejected an argument that such deficiencies in the plead-
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 281, which provides:
The jury may take with them in their retirement the charges and instruc-
tions, general or special, which were given and read to them, and any written
evidence, except the depositions of witnesses, but shall not take with them any
special charges which have been refused. Where part only of a paper has been
read in evidence, the jury shall not take the same with them, unless the part so
read to them is detached from that which was excluded.
296. 580 S.W.2d at 669-70. Butsee Sidran v. Western Textile Prod. Co., 258 S.W.2d 830,
832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), rev'don other grounds, 153 Tex. 21, 262 S.W.2d 942 (1954).
297. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2135 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
298. Formerly, the statute exempted only female parents or guardians. See 1973 Tex.
Gen. Laws, ch. 85, § 2, at 175.
299. 578 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1979).
300. Rejecting Stoner's contention that a judgment nihil dicit was involved, as well as the
Malkans' contention that it was a judgment upon trial, the court found it to be a post-answer
default judgment. Id. at 682.
301. Id. at 683-84.
302. Id. at 684. In contrast, the court found that Stoner had fair notice of the contention
upon which the Malkans sought declaratory judgment and that portion of the judgment was
therefore proper, even without the trial amendment. Id.
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ings were waived or tried by consent under rules 90303 or 67,304 stating:
"Rule 90 does not apply to a post-answer default judgment. . . .Likewise,
an absent party will not be considered to have tried an unpled cause of
action by implied consent under Rule 67 where fair notice of that cause of
action is not in the pleadings. '305
The Texas Legislature enacted a significant addition to the arsenal of a
party seeking to collect on a judgment during the survey period. Article
3827a 3°6 now provides that a judgment creditor whose debtor owns prop-
erty that cannot readily be reached by ordinary legal process of attachment
or levy is entitled to aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction by injunc-
tion or otherwise in reaching the property to satisfy the judgment. ' 30 7 This
aid may be obtained "in the same suit in which the judgment is rendered
or in a new and independent suit."' 30 8 Significantly, a judgment creditor
proceeding under this section "is entitled to recover reasonable costs, in-
cluding attorney's fees."'309
XV. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
During this survey period, the Texas Legislature amended article
2250310 to add a new type of interlocutory order from which appeal will
lie. Effective August 27, 1979, an order "[c]ertifying or refusing to certify a
class in a suit brought pursuant to Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure" may now be appealed immediately.31' This change represents
a marked departure from the general rule followed in the federal courts
prohibiting interlocutory appeals of such orders. 3
12
Texas courts also considered interlocutory appeals during the survey pe-
riod. In Transamerica Insurance Co. P. Price Construction, Inc. 313 the court
considered the application of rule 21c 314 to an appeal from an interlocu-
tory order. The appellant in that case filed a motion for an extension of
303. TEX. R. Cwv. P. 90 provides that pleading defects not brought to the attention of the
trial court before judgment are waived.
304. TEX. R. Civ. P. 67 provides that issues not raised by the pleadings may be tried by
implied consent.
305. 578 S.W.2d at 684-85.
306. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3827a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
307. Id. art. 3827a(a). The property may include present or future rights to property,
but must not be exempt from seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities.
308. Id. art. 3827a(d).
309. Id. art. 3827a(e).
310. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2250 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
311. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2250, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980). This change effec-
tively overrules the result reached in Unnamed Members of Class v. McMahon, 582 S.W.2d
600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1979, no writ), which held that certification of a
class, refusal to certify, or decertification is not a final order and may not be appealed imme-
diately in the absence of legislative authorization. The amendment is intended to avert the
waste of "lawyer effort, client money, and judicial time" involved when a class action deter-
mination is found to be erroneous on appeal and a retrial of the case is therefore necessary.
See O'Connor, Legislative Program: Amendment to Article 2250, 42 TEX. B.J. 23 (1979).
312. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 98 S. Ct. 2459, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978).
313. 577 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
314. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c. The rule allows a motion to extend time to be filed within 15
days of the last date for filing.
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time to file the record that fully complied with rule 21c, 3 15 but the motion
was some eight days late under the more abbreviated limitations set forth
in rule 385.3 16 Following the lead of an earlier decision by the El Paso
court of civil appeals,31 7 the court held that rule 385, the more specific rule
governing interlocutory appeals, controls over the general requirements of
rule 21 c.318 Accordingly, the court found itself without jurisdiction and
dismissed the appeal.3 19
The opinion of the court in Cooper v. Bowser32° clearly illustrates that
rule 364321 means what it literally says. In that case the appellant appealed
from a judgment against him in the sum of $240,725.30 plus interest from
the date of judgment. The combined supersedeas and cost bond filed by
the appellant, however, totaled only the principal sum of the judgment
plus the $500 required to perfect an appeal under rule 354(a). 322 Recog-
nizing that it is "impossible for an appellant to determine accurately the
amount of post judgment interest which will accrue while he pursues the
appellate process, '323 the court nevertheless held that rule 364 is "clear
and unambiguous" and that failure to include the interest required by that
rule rendered the amount of the bond "patently insufficient. ' 324 There-
fore, in order to continue suspended enforcement of the judgment, the
court required an amended supersedeas bond to be filed including interest
on the principal amount at the rate prescribed in the judgment. The court
held, however, that the orginal bond filed was sufficient as a cost bond to
perfect the appeal.325
Two courts of civil appeals during the survey period reached opposite
results in considering the situation in which the court reporter lost photo-
graphs introduced into evidence during the trial. In Diaz v. Deavers,326 an
assault and battery action, the appellant sought to have the cause reversed
and remanded after the court reporter lost eight exhibits consisting of pho-
tographic slides depicting the injury received by the appellant in the as-
sault. Although the court recognized the rule that "a reviewing court may
reverse a judgment where the appellant, without fault, has been deprived
of a statement of facts,' 3 2 7 the court refused to reverse the trial court be-
315. 577 S.W.2d at 579.
316. TEX. R. Civ. P. 385(b) requires a motion to extend time for filing the record to be
filed no later than five days after the date the record is due.
317. Trial v. McCoy, 535 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
318. 577 S.W.2d at 579-80.
319. Id. at 580.
320. 583 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
321. TEX. R. Civ. P. 364.
322. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354(a).
323. 583 S.W.2d at 806.
324. Id. at 806-07.
325. Id. at 807. Although the combined bond did not mention costs on appeal, it did
obligate the appellant and his surety to perform the judgment of the appellate court. Since
any such judgment would require costs, the court held the absence of any express statement
to that effect was irrelevant. Id.
326. 574 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ dism'd).
327. Id. at 608 (citing Victory v. Hamilton, 127 Tex. 203, 91 S.W.2d 697 (1936); Goodin
v. Geller, 521 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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cause the slides were not material to a proper determination of the case.
Finding that ample evidence of the nature and extent of the appellant's
injuries had been introduced in other forms, the court held that the slides
were merely cumulative and, at best, would serve only to create a conflict
with the appellee's testimony.328 Accordingly, the slides were not material
because the only issue preserved on appeal was whether any evidence ex-
isted to support the findings of the jury.3 2 9
In contrast, the court in Rodriguez v. Standard Fire Insurance Co. 330 held
that the loss of seventeen photographic exhibits by the court reporter, with-
out any fault on the part of the appellant, required reversal and remand
for a new trial on the merits. In Rodriguez, however, the testimony ad-
duced at the trial of the appellant's workers' compensation case was found
by the court to be "without meaning" and "confusing" in the absence of
the photographs. 33' Rejecting the appellee's suggestion that new photo-
graphs could be substituted or that the trial court could resolve the matter
under rule 377(d),332 the court held that the appellant's "right to have the
cause reviewed on appeal can be preserved to her in no other way than by
a retrial of the case."333
The inability of the appellant to obtain a statement of facts after due
diligence and through no fault of his own also led to a reversal and re-
mand in Fisher v. First Security State Bank.334 In that case, not only did
the appellant and his counsel fail to appear at trial, but, in addition, no
court reporter was present. Although the appellee submitted a narrative
statement of evidence adduced at trial that was approved by the trial court,
the court of civil appeals held that the appellant was "entitled" to a com-
plete statement of facts in question and answer form.335 Further, the court
held that "[w]e need a question and answer statement of facts as repro-
duced verbatim from the spoken word of both counsel and the witnesses,
unblemished by human interpretation. '336
The importance of the distinction between a postage meter stamp and a
postmark of the United States Postal Service complying with rule 5337 is
328. 574 S.W.2d at 608.
329. Id.
330. 573 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
331. Id. at 595.
332. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377(d) allows the trial court to settle disputes between the parties
concerning what actually occurred at trial.
333. 573 S.W.2d at 596.
334. 576 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
335. Id. at 887.
336. Id.
337. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5 provides in part:
[I]f. . . any matter relating to taking an appeal. . . from the trial court to any
higher court, . . . is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail in
an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and is deposited in
the mail one day or more before the last day for filing same, the same, if
received by the clerk not more than ten days tardily, shall be filed by the clerk
and be deemed filed in time; provided, however, that a legible postmark af-
fixed by the United States Postal Service shall be prima facie evidence of the
date of mailing.
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well illustrated by Albaugh v. State Bank.338 The appeal bond in that case
was due on April 30; it was not received by the clerk, however, until May
3. Although the envelope in which the appellant had mailed the bond
showed a metered stamp dated April 26, the postmark on the envelope was
dated May 1, 1979. Noting that the metered stamp was "of the type used
in business offices by persons other than the United States Postal Serv-
ice,"'339 the court held that the stamp "at best" indicated the date the envel-
ope was run through the meter and had "little, if any, probative force as
evidence of the date of mailing. '340 Since the postmark "affixed by the
United States Postal Service" within the meaning of rule 5 showed that the




Two cases decided during the survey period discuss the application of
the doctrine of res judicata to proceedings for a temporary injunction. In
Brooks v. Jones3 4 2 the supreme court held that issues decided in a tempo-
rary injunction hearing would not be binding on a losing party who did
not elect to pursue an appeal from such determination, but instead pro-
ceeded to a trial on the merits for a permanent injunction. The court, how-
ever, clearly implied that a party would be bound by the matters decided
in a temporary injunction hearing if an appeal was taken from the hear-
ing.
34 3
As noted in a prior Survey, 344 a judgment is conclusive as to any com-
pulsory counterclaim that is required to be asserted under rule 97.345 In
Stubbs v. Patterson Dental Laboratories346 the court of civil appeals con-
cluded that the foregoing rule was inapplicable to an order of dismissal
entered after a hearing on an application for a temporary injunction. The
defendant employer had instituted a prior action for temporary and per-
manent injunctive relief against the plaintiff employee who had allegedly
violated the terms of a noncompetitive agreement; a temporary injunction
was issued that enjoined the employee from operating a dental laboratory.
On the motion of the employer, the trial court entered an order dismissing
338. 586 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
339. Id. at 137-38.
340. Id. at 138 n.2. The court rejected a suggestion in Ector County Independent School
Dist. v. Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d 576, 583 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ), that a
metered stamp is "some evidence" of the date of mailing. With respect to another method of
proving the actual date of mailing, see Hodges v. State, 539 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. -
Austin 1976, no writ) (unopposed affidavit of counsel sufficient).
341. 586 S.W.2d at 138.
342. 578 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1979).
343. Id. at 672-73; see Furr's, Inc. v. United Specialty Advertising Co., 385 S.W.2d 456
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); International Longshoremen v. Galveston
Maritime Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no writ); Wilson v. Abi-
lene Independent School Dist., 204 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1947, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
344. Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 248, 265
(1974) (discussing Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America, 496 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1973)).
345. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97.
346. 573 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
[Vol. 34
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
the prior action "with prejudice. ' 347 Thereafter, the employee brought a
suit against the employer, seeking damages for having been temporarily
enjoined from operating the dental laboratory and claiming that he was
coerced by fraud and undue influence into signing the noncompetitive
agreement. Rejecting the employer's argument that the employee's claim
should have been asserted as a counterclaim in the prior action and, there-
fore, was barred by the order of dismissal, the court of civil appeals held
that the prior order was not a final judgment on the merits to which the
doctrine of res judicata applied. 348
XVII. MISCELLANEOUS
Rule 245 provides in part that "[t]he court may set contested cases on
motion of any party, or on the court's own motion with reasonable notice
of not less than 10 days to the parties, or by agreement of the parties.
349
The supreme court in Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn350 held that a request
by a party for a trial setting constituted sufficient notice of the trial setting
within the meaning of the rule. The defendant, who was unrepresented by
counsel, 351 received a request for a trial setting from the opposing party
more than ten days prior to the requested trial date. The defendant failed
to appear on the requested date, however, and the trial court entered a
judgment against him. On appeal, the supreme court ruled that the re-
quest was sufficient notice of the trial setting since "[ilt is reasonable to
assume that if a trial setting is requested from the district clerk, a litigant is
put on notice that trial may be on that requested date.
352
Section 6 of article 200a was amended in 1977 to provide that "[a] dis-
trict judge shall request the Presiding Judge to assign a judge of the Ad-
ministrative District to hear any motions to recuse such district judge from
a case pending in his court. '353 In McLeod v. Harris354 the supreme court
concluded that a district judge has no discretion to hear a motion to recuse
that is directed at him, and that article 200a imposes a mandatory duty on
a district judge to request the presiding judge of the administrative district
347. Id. at 276.
348. Id. The Stubbs decision is consistent with Brooks since no appeal was taken after
the proceeding on the temporary injunction.
349. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245. Prior to Jan. 1, 1976, no rule required notice to the parties of a
trial setting made at the regular call of the docket. See Plains Growers, Inc. v. Jordan, 519
S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1974). Pursuant to the 1976 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, TEX. R. Civ. P. 245 (1975) was amended and TEX. R. Civ. P. 330(b) (1975) was
repealed, so that ten days' notice of a trial setting is now required in all district courts for
contested cases.
350. 573 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1978).
35 1. In rejecting the argument that failure to receive notice of the actual trial date is a
denial of due process for a litigant not represented by counsel, the court concluded that there
is no basis "for differentiating between litigants represented by counsel and litigants not
represented by counsel in determining whether rules of procedure must be followed." Id. at
184. See also Stein v. Lewisville Independent School Dist., 481 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 948 (1973).
352. 573 S.W.2d at 185.
353. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
354. 582 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1979).
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to assign another district judge to hear a motion for recusal.355
With respect to the timing of a motion for directed verdict, a court of
civil appeals recognized the obvious proposition that a directed verdict
cannot be instructed for a defendant prior to the completion of the plain-
tifrs case. 356
In 1975 the Texas Legislature amended the sequestration statute in an
effort to comply with federal due process standards. 357 For the same rea-
son, the Texas Supreme Court amended the rules of civil procedure gov-
erning attachment,358 garnishment, 359 and sequestration. 360 Despite these
changes to the statute and to the rules of procedure, the debtor in Monroe
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 361 contended that the sequestration
statute remains unconstitutional because the statute fails to provide for no-
tice and a hearing prior to the deprivation of the debtor's property. After
analyzing the three leading Supreme Court decisions in this area, 362 the
court of civil appeals concluded that the sequestration statute is not uncon-
stitutional because the initial seizure of property must be based on sworn
ex parte documents and an early opportunity is afforded the debtor to put
creditor to his proof.363
In addition to the foregoing decisions, a number of other miscellaneous
developments occurred as a result of legislative enactments or amend-
ments. Article 2226, which authorizes the recovery of a reasonable attor-
355. Id. at 775. For the substantive grounds for disqualifying a judge, see TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 11; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 15 (Vernon 1969); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 30.01 (Vernon 1966); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 app., Canon 3C of the
Code of Judicial Conduct (Vernon Supp. 1980).
356. Ormsby v. Travelers Indem. Co., 573 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978,
no writ). See generally 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 11.26 (rev. 1970).
357. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
358. TEX. R. Civ. P. 592-609.
359. TEX. R. Civ. P. 658-679.
360. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696-716.
361. 573 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
362. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted in 29 Sw.
L.J. 660 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972). See also Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex 1974), vacated, 534 F.2d
609 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that prior version of sequestration statute was unconstitutional);
Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ) (holding that article 4076, which permits postjudgment garnishment, is consti-
tutional); Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding that postjudgment garnishment
statute is constitutional); Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (holding that art. 4084, which permits
prejudgment garnishment, is unconstitutional).
363. The constitutionality of and the amendments to the attachment, garnishment, and
sequestration statutes and rules have generated a great deal of discussion. See, e.g., Beard,
Due Process andAncillary Writs, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 23 (1978); Dorsaneo, Creditors'Rights,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 245 (1978); Newton, Fuentes "'Repossessed" Recon-
sidered, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 497 (1976); Touchy, Sequestration Made Whole Again, 41 TEX.
B.J. 943 (1978); Comment, Constitutional Dimensions of the Amended Texas Sequestration
Statute, 29 Sw. L.J. 884 (1975). See also 2 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE§§ 40.01-42.203 (1979).
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ney's fee in connection with the successful prosecution of certain types of
claims, was recently amended so that
[i]n a proceeding before the court, or in a jury case where the issue of
amount of attorney's fees is submitted to the court for determination
by agreement, the court may in its discretion take judicial knowledge
of the usual and customary fees in such matters and of the contents of
the case file without receiving further evidence. 364
In a further effort to reduce the length of trials and perhaps to ease the
burden on certain individuals who would otherwise have to testify, the
legislature enacted article 3737h,365 which now allows the parties, by way
of affidavit, to prove the amount and reasonableness of charges for services
rendered by other persons and institutions. As a condition precedent to
the application of article 3737h, the affidavit must be filed with the clerk of
the court and a copy served on each other party to the cause at least four-
teen days prior to the date set for trial.366 In order to controvert a claim
covered by such affidavit, the opposing party must file a controverting affi-
davit and serve a copy on the other party within ten days after receipt of
such party's copy of the affidavit, or prior to the commencement of trial if
leave of court is obtained. 367 The counter-affidavit must give reasonable
notice of the basis upon which the party filing it intends at trial to contro-
vert all or part of the claim covered by the initial affidavit.368 Article
3737h is inapplicable to an action on a sworn account 369 and to claims for
attorney's fees charged in the trial of the cause or preparation thereof.370
Finally, for the practitioner who is faced with the prospect of examining a
deaf person or who represents a deaf party, note should be taken of article
3712a,371 which requires the court to appoint an interpreter for such indi-
viduals.
364. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
365. Id. art. 3737h.
366. Id. § I(b).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. § 1(a).
370. Id. § 2.
371. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3712a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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